FESTO: BLESSING TO PATENT HOLDERS OR THORN IN THEIR
SIDES?
The Supreme Court makes another attempt to strike a balance between
protecting an inventor’s patent rights and ensuring adequate notice to
the public of what constitutes patent infringement. This iBrief discusses
the Supreme Court ruling in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., Ltd.,1 and its foreseeable effects on the practice of patent
law.
On May 28, 2002, the Supreme Court changed the doctrine of equivalents as we now
know it. Their earlier decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd.,2
held that any patent application amendment made for patentability purposes which narrows the
scope of the patent is subject to prosecution history estoppel.3 This latest decision overrules the
Federal Circuit’s holding that when it applies, estoppel acts as a complete bar against any claim
of equivalence.4 The Supreme Court held that an amendment creates a presumption that estoppel
bars such a claim, but that presumption is rebuttable.5 In order to rebut the presumption, a
patentee “must show that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably
be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged
equivalent.”6 The Court further held that not only is the burden on the patentee to show that an
amendment was not made for the purpose of patentability,7 but he or she must also show that the
amendment does not surrender the particular equivalent in question.8

Background
Facts
Festo Corporation is the owner of two patents for a “magnetic rodless cylinder, a pistondriven device that relies on magnets to move objects in a conveying system.”9 After submitting
its initial patent application, Festo amended the claims of its applications. The amendments to the
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first application were made after the patent examiner rejected the claims under 35 U.S.C. §112.10
The examiner stated that the claims themselves were unclear and were made in an impermissible
way. The amendments of both applications had the effect of adding a new limitation to the
patents. Specifically, the claims of both patents were amended to recite a pair of sealing rings,
each having a lip on one side. The claims of the first application were also amended to limit the
outer shell (“sleeve”) to magnetizable material.
After issuance of the patents, Festo filed suit, claiming that a device placed in the market
by defendants, Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd. (“SMC”) infringed Festo’s patents
under the doctrine of equivalents. The accused device employs a single sealing ring with a twoway lip, rather than a pair each having a lip on one side, and contains a sleeve that is made of a
non-magnetizable alloy, rather than a magnetizable material. The device, therefore, does not fall
within the literal claims of Festo’s patents.

Competing Sides
It is important to note that conflicting interests lie at the heart of patent law. In particular,
there is a realistic need for clear and concise boundaries to a patentee’s rights under his patent.
The patentee and the public both need to be able to determine what is and is not covered under
the patent. Working against this, however, are the inadequacies of any language as well as the
patentee’s inability to predict the directions his or her and other technologies will take. The most
certain alternative for providing clear and unquestionable notice to the public and the patentee of
the boundaries of a patent would be to limit the coverage of the claims to only that which they
literally convey. However, because there are not always words that can be used to relay every
aspect of an invention, this could severely limit the value and scope of the patent.
In order to strike a balance between these competing sides, the Supreme Court has
adopted the doctrine of equivalents, but has limited its use by employing prosecution history
estoppel. In theory, therefore, the patent holder is granted greater leeway in enforcing his or her
patent, but at the same time, the public is given a concrete record from which to interpret at least
the amended terms of the patent and what is covered therein.
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Doctrine of Equivalents
The doctrine of equivalents holds that a patentee can claim rights to inconsequential
alterations to the thing patented, which are not literally covered by the original claims, but that
could be achieved with little effort. In other words, it protects a patentee from infringement by a
person who makes insubstantial changes to the patented invention, taking the new device out of
the literal realm of the claims, yet basically embodying the same invention.11 The theory is that
“if two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the
same result, they are the same, even though they differ in name, form or shape.”12
The Supreme Court first adopted the doctrine in Winans v. Denmead in 1854.13 In
Winans, the patent at issue involved a new mode of operation for railroad cars.14 The accused
device employed this same mode of operation; however, the geometrical form of the cars was
different than that claimed by the patentee.15 The Court held that because “[t]he exclusive right to
the thing patented is not secured, if the public are at liberty to make substantial copies of it,
varying its form or proportions[,] … the patentee, having described his invention, and shown its
principles, and claimed it in that form which most perfectly embodies it, is, in contemplation of
law, deemed to claim every form which his invention may be copied, unless he manifests an
intention to disclaim some of those forms.”16
The doctrine of equivalents was invoked primarily for the purpose of accommodating for
the inability of language “to capture the essence of innovation.”17 It recognizes that words may
not always be able to aptly convey the basis of an invention. It also recognizes that “to permit
imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the
protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing.”18 The Supreme Court reaffirmed
the doctrine in 1950 in Graver Tank19 and again in 1997 in Warner-Jenkinson Co20.
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In Graver Tank, the Supreme Court concluded that the doctrine of equivalents only
applies if the differences between the accused and claimed inventions are insubstantial. It also
held that when considering an allegation of infringement under the doctrine an important factor to
consider when comparing the claimed and accused invention “is whether persons reasonably
skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient contained in the
patent with one that was.”21
Nearly 50 years later in Warner-Jenkinson the Court “endeavored to clarify the proper
scope of the doctrine.”22 The Court first held that an inquiry into equivalence of an invention
should be performed on an “element-by-element basis” rather than as a comparison of the
inventions as a whole.23 The essential inquiry is therefore, “[d]oes the accused product or process
contain elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element in the patented invention[.]”24
The Court went on to hold that prosecution history estoppel does serve as a limit on non-literal
infringement, but refused to apply it to all claim amendments regardless of the reasons for them.25

Prosecution History Estoppel
The price of this broadening of a patentee’s rights enabled under the doctrine of
equivalents is uncertainty. Innovators and competitors are left without a clear indication of what
is and is not covered by a patent. One helpful source of clarity has been the prosecution history
of the patent. Prosecution history estoppel dictates that the claims of a patent must be interpreted
in light of the prosecution history, or the process through which the Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”) issued the patent based on a submitted application. More specifically, the claims must be
interpreted in light of their rejections, cancellations and amendments. A patentee is estopped
from asserting equivalence for a claim element when, for the purpose of patentability, he or she
has amended a claim in a way that surrenders the subject matter that he or she is now alleging is
an equivalent. For example, if the PTO rejects a claim, and the patentee forfeits his or her right to
appeal the rejection and amends the claim such that the scope is narrowed, he or she cannot then
allege infringement under the doctrine of equivalents for something that would have been literally
covered under the original claim but that is not covered by the amended claim.
Because the purpose of the doctrine of equivalents is to allow the patentee to claim what
may have been indescribable at the time of drafting, either because of the limitations of the
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language, unforeseeability, or general equity, when subject matter is encompassed in the original
claim but then eliminated from it in response to a rejection in order to receive a patent, the
applicability of the doctrine is no longer justified. The patentee can no longer contend that he or
she was unable to put into words or to foresee the particular subject matter, or that it would be
equitable to interpret the claims as covering the subject matter that was surrendered.
As stated above, in Warner-Jenkinson the Supreme Court affirmed the application of
prosecution history estoppel to claims under the doctrine of equivalents, but refused to apply it to
all claim amendments regardless of the reasons for them.26 To do so would be inconsistent with
prior cases and could “upset the basic assumptions of the PTO without substantial reason for
doing so.”27 The Court held that there is a presumption that the amendment was made for a
reason relating to patentability, and therefore, the patentee is estopped from claiming
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents with respect to that claim.28

However, the

patentee is given the opportunity to rebut this presumption with evidence indicating a different
reason behind the amendment.29

Holding of Festo
The district court held that because the amendments made by Festo during the
prosecution process were not made with the purpose of overcoming prior art, they did not invoke
prosecution history estoppel and Festo was not barred from claiming infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents .30 SMC’s device, therefore, was held to infringe Festo’s patents.31
The Federal Circuit affirmed.32 However, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded33 in
light of its decision in Warner-Jenkinson where the Court reaffirmed the doctrine of equivalents,
but recognized that competitors should be able to rely on the prosecution history, when an
amendment is made for the purpose of attaining a patent, to ensure that the subject matter
surrendered by that amendment cannot later be recaptured by the patentee.34 On remand, the
Federal Circuit reversed, holding that estoppel arises whenever any amendment is made to the
claims in order to comply with the Patent Act, not just amendments made to avoid or escape prior
26
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art.35 The court went on to hold that whenever estoppel applies, it acts as a complete bar to any
claim of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.36 This was in sharp contrast to the
flexible bar that was applied in prior cases. The court justified its disregard of precedent by
concluding that the flexible bar had proved unworkable.37
The end result was that the Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s holding that
prosecution history estoppel applies to all claim amendments, but held that it does not create a
complete bar to claims of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.38 Now, a rebuttable
presumption is created in favor of the alleged infringer and the burden is on the patentee to prove
not only that the amendment was not made for patentability, but also that the subject matter of the
alleged equivalent was not surrendered by the amendment and that the particular equivalent was
not foreseeable at the time the claim was amended.39

Festo’s Impact on Patent Law
The ruling in Festo made three significant changes to the prior law regarding the doctrine
of equivalents and prosecution history estoppel. First, it makes prosecution history estoppel
applicable to any claim amendment made during the course of prosecution proceedings. This is
in contrast to its prior application only to amendments made for a limited number of reasons.
Second, it eliminates the complete bar to the use of the doctrine of equivalents imposed by the
Federal Circuit whenever an amendment is made. This enabled patentees to assert claims of
equivalence despite amendments made during the prosecution proceedings. Third, the Court
added guidelines on how the flexible bar should be applied. These guidelines shift more of the
burden onto the patentee to disprove the presumption that he surrendered any right to equivalence
when he made the amendment.

Possible Effects of Changes
Festo has been characterized as “one of the most important patent law cases in decades,”
and has been described as having “reaffirmed a central tenet of patent law and restored the
inherent value of more than a million patents.”40 Rather than declaring that the inherent value of
millions of patents has been restored, it may be more accurate to say that rights which the patent
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holders believed that they had at the time of the prosecution proceedings have been restored to
them. As stated in the Supreme Court’s opinion, fundamental alterations, like the one made by
the Federal Circuit in invoking a complete bar to claims of equivalence when no such bar had
been in existence, “risk destroying the legitimate expectations of inventors in their property.”41
Prior to the Federal Circuit’s decision, inventors were operating under the assumption that when
choosing to amend a claim rather than utilizing their right to appeal a rejection, they were not
completely giving up all rights to claims of equivalence. Had they known that they were giving
up such rights, they may have opted to appeal. Thus, it would seem unfair to impose such a
complete bar on patentees whose patents were issued prior to the ruling. The Supreme Court’s
reversal and reinstatement of a slightly altered, but still flexible bar, may have remedied the
apparent injustice.
In addition, the ruling may have the effect of increasing the costs associated with having
a patent issued and enforcing the rights to that patent for a number of reasons. First of all, under
this decision patent claim drafting has the potential to be more time consuming and more
expensive. Based on the slightly altered flexible bar established, one way to rebut the
presumption that estoppel bars the use of the doctrine of equivalents is for the patentee to show
that the equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of the application.42 Patent attorneys have the
new burden of drafting claims that incorporate every foreseeable alteration known at that time.
This could mean increasing the number of claims tremendously in order to incorporate every
possible angle, as well as increasing the amount of time spent researching prior art and the state
of the inventive art at the time of filing. Because the presumption will be against the patentee any
time he or she amends a claim, attorneys are likely to spend more time drafting the original
claims and to include more and narrower claims in order to ensure that they will be patentable
without amending. Another additional cost could arise from an increase in litigation due to the
Supreme Court’s new guidelines that will need to be tested before they become completely clear.
However, by rejecting the Court of Appeals’ complete bar on claims of equivalence when
any amendment is made during the prosecution of the patent, the Supreme Court may have
enabled smaller businesses to remain competitive.
The previous holding of the CAFC tended to favor large companies that
can afford procuring large numbers of patents for an invention and
40
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worked against smaller companies and individuals that can typically
pursue only a small number of patents on significant inventions. Some
gray in claim scope interpretation may somewhat constrain the need for
large numbers of patent filings to protect an invention.43
This holding seems to be a mixed blessing for patent holders. On the one hand, it makes
enforcing a patent easier now that the doctrine of equivalents is again available despite
amendments made to the claims. On the other hand, it may make proving infringement more
difficult since now the presumption is against the patentee and the burden is on him to prove that
the equivalent was not surrendered or foreseeable.

If the accused device emerges on the

marketplace relatively soon after the patent is issued, it may be very difficult for a patentee to
prove that its differences from the claims if the issued patent were indeed unforeseeable.

Unresolved Issue
The requirement of unforeseeability at the time of amendment raises an interesting
question. When a patentee is making an amendment to a claim for whatever reason, he or she is
limited to the language in the specification. What does he or she do then if an equivalent
invention was not foreseeable at the time the specification was drafted, and thus the language for
incorporating it is not present in the specification, but it has since become foreseeable? Is it really
accurate for the Supreme Court to say that “the patentee, as author of the claim language, may be
expected to draft claims encompassing readily known equivalents”44 when patentees do not
actually have the whole of the English language at their disposal?
In addition, when a patentee is in the process of amending claims for reasons other than
patentability, he or she must work in conjunction with the examiner. In order to get the patent
issued, the examiner must agree that the words used convey the required clarity of the subject
matter. For this reason, the words ultimately used may not have been the exact words the
patentee would have selected given the freedom to choose without restriction. Again, this is in
conflict with the Supreme Court’s statement that the patentee has the freedom to choose his
words with the knowledge of their effect.

Conclusion
The doctrines of equivalents and prosecution history estoppel recognize that the public
needs to have a clear and accurate understanding of what a patent is covering. However, they
also recognize that because of the limitations of both language and the patentee’s knowledge at
the time of filing an application, it is relatively impossible to literally cover all aspects of an
43

Interview with Rick Jenkins, Partner, Jenkins & Wilson, P.A., in Durham, NC. (July 19, 2002)

invention in one document. Through this case, the Supreme Court has altered the application of
both of these doctrines. It has made the application of prosecution history estoppel more frequent
and the doctrine of equivalents less difficult. It remains to be seen what the effect of this ruling
will be on the practice of patent law in general, but it is clear that it has both helped and hurt an
innovator’s ability to attain a patent for his or her invention and to protect it from infringers.
By: Jennifer Miller
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